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:§uprtmt (!tuur! of t4t l!htUrb, ~tatt!i 
OCTOBER TERM, 1977 
No. 76-1.701 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, 
Petitioner 
v. 
HIRAM G. HILL~ JR., ET AL. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
BRIEF AMICUS· CURIAE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL nEFENSE FUND,. 
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY, 
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
SfERRA CLUB, AND 
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE 
INTEREST OF AMICI 
The parties to this brief amicus curiae are the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, the National Audubon Society,. the 
National Wildlife Federation, the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, the Sierra Club, and Defenders of Wildlife. 
- f Each of these organizations is a private, non-profit na-
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tional membership organization dedicated to protecting 
and improving the quality of the human environment in 
a scientifically sound manner. Each also has a special 
interest in assuring the wise conservation of the nation's 
wildlife resources, including endangered species of wild-
life. Because of that special interest, this brief amicus 
curiae is filed so that the Court will have before it a full 
discussion of the vital issues presented by this first case 
under the Endangered Species Act. Both the Acting 
Solicitor General, on behalf of petitioner Tennessee Valley 
Authority, and counsel for respondents have consented to 
the filing of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents the Court with its first opportunity 
to consider the meaning of the Endangered Species Act of 
1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1531 et seq. 
The Court's decision, however, will constitute more than 
a mere exercise in statutory construction; it will also 
affect significantly the future of the natio.n's endangered 
species preservation program, and even more fundamen-
tally, the whole history of efforts by which man has sought 
to establish his relationship with the various forms of life 
with which he shares the earth. 
From one perspective, the narrow controversy involved 
in this case pits the snail darter, an endangered species of 
fish now found only in the swift flowing shallows of the 
Little Tennessee River, against Tellico Dam, a nearly 
complete dam under construction by the Tennessee Valley 
Autho.rity as part of a water reso.urce and regional eco-
nomic development project known as the Tellico. project. 
The trial court below found that if the Tellico Dam portion 
of the project is completed, the reservoir that forms be-
hind it will inundate and destroy the habitat upon which 
the snail darter's survival depends. There is no disagree-
ment among the parties as to the certainty of this fact, 
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nor is there any serious disagreement with the conclusion 
of both courts below that this fact alone constitutes a 
violation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 1 
provided that the Act applies at all in the circumstances of 
this case. 
From a broader perspective, this case presents the ques-
tion whether the clear Congressional commitment to the 
preservation of as many of the earth's diverse forms of 
life as it is within man's power to preserve is to be quali-
fied and diluted by implied exceptions or tenuous doctrines 
of implied repeal and administrative discretion. This most 
fundamental question is starkly presented here in what 
may be the first occasion in which the fate of an entire 
species is to be consciously decided. 
The basic legal disagreement here is over whether the 
Endangered Species Act properly applies in the circum-
stances of this case so as to compel that the dam not be 
completed. The petitioner Tennessee Valley Authority 
argues that the Act does not so apply, either because it 
was never intended to apply in circumstances such as 
those presented here and should not now be so interpreted, 
or because it has in effect been amended by certain appro-
priations legislation subsequently enacted. Each of these 
arguments is addressed and rebutted in this brief. 
1 Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 87 Stat. 892, 16 U.S.C. 
(Supp. V) 1536, provides in relevant part that all federal agencies 
"shaIl, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secre-
tary [of the Interior or Commerce, as appropriate], utilize their 
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter . .. by 
taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, 
funded or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued 
existen'ce of such endangered species and threatened species or 
result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species 
which is determined by the Secretary ... to be critical." 
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. ARGUMENT 
I. The Language, Purpose, And Spirit Of The Endan-
gered Species Act Require That Section 7 Be Strictly 
Enforced To Prevent The Destruction Of The Snail 
Darter And Its Critical Habitat. 
In parts of the public press and elsewhere, the decision 
this Court is called upon to review has been subjected to 
skepticism and doubt. To halt completion of Tellico Dam 
at an advanced stage of its construction just to perpetuate 
a tiny species of fish which had not even been known to 
exist when construction began has been seen by some as 
an environmental folly. Petitioner's brief reflects this 
view when it states that the "plain meaning" rule that 
guided the interpretation of the Act by the court below 
should be rejected because "it is well established that even 
the unambiguous meaning of statutory words does not 
control when such a reading would be unreasonable in 
view of the statute's purpose" (Pet. Br., p. 25). In sup-
port of this proposition, petitioner quotes the 1892 lan-
guage of this Court in Church of the Holy Trinity v. 
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, that "a thing may be 
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the 
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the 
intention of its makers," and that "frequently words of 
general meaning are used in a statute, words broad 
enough to include an act in question, and yet a considera-
tion of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment ... makes it unreasonable to be-
lieve that the legislator intended to include the particular 
act" (Pet. Br., pp. 25-26, n. 19). It is remarkable that 
petitioner attacks the decision of the court below as yield-
ing an unreasonable result without making any effort to 
discern the purposes of the Endangered Species Act, with-
out any "consideration of the whole legislation," and with-
out any inquiry into its spirit. 
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What then are the purposes of the Endangered Species 
Act, and what does a "consideration of the whole legisla-
tion" reveal about the meaning of the provision in ques-
tion here? Had petitioner made these inquiries, it would 
have discovered that the Act, in a multitude of ways, 
represents a sweeping and uncompromising commitment 
to the preservation of the earth's genetic diversity. The 
Act does this first by boldly declaring a purpose of pre-
serving "the ecosystems upon which endangered species 
and threatened species depend."2 Neither stuffed museum 
specimens nor caged zoo animals nor transplanted popula-
tions in substitute ecosystems can satisfy this fundamental 
goal. Instead, the Act demands and requires the preserva-
tion not only of endangered species themselves but also of 
the habitats upon which they depend. Another major 
purpose of the Act is the restoration of populations of 
such species to levels at which the protection of the Act is 
no longer necessary:3 Thus, it is not sufficient merely to 
take a "hands off" attitude and avoid injury to endan-
gered species; it may also be necessary to take affirmative 
action to enhance their prospects for survival. Cf. De-
fenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 
(D.D.C.). 
These sweeping goals are reflected throughout the Act. 
For example, the Act directs all federal agencies to carry 
out programs for the "conservation" of wildlife, 16 U.S.C. 
(Supp. V) 1536, and defines the term "conservation" in 
an all-inclusive fashion to mean "the use of all methods 
and procedures which are necessary" to accomplish the 
goal of restoration. 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1532 (2) (em-
phasis added). Cf. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 
supra at 170. Similarly, the Act gives to the term "take," 
a term that is critical to the functioning of virtually 
every federal wildlife conservation statute, a definition 
that is broader than that found in any other such statute 
216 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1531(b). 
316 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1532(2). 
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or in the regulations that implement such other statutes.4 
Further, the Act makes eligible for its protective provi-
sions any species of any type by defining the term "fish 
or wildlife" to include "any member of the animal king-
dom." 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1532(5). Again, no other 
federal wildlife conservation statute is clearly so expansive 
in scope.5 Finally, the Act expressly authorizes a balanc-
ing of the goal of preserving endangered species w~th 
other competing social goals in only one narrowly CIr-
cumscribed instance, where it authorizes excepting from 
the protections of the Act any insect species determined 
"to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions 
of this chapter would present an overwhelming and over-
riding risk to man." 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1532(4). 
Why would Congress have made such a sweeping and 
uncompromising commitment to the preservation of the 
earth's genetic diversity by enacting a law which, on its 
face, appears to give paramount importance to the inter-
ests of little known and apparently valueless creatures? 
Because, despite those superficial appearances, Congress 
was persuaded that the long-run interests of human wel-
fare were best served by preserving as much of the earth's 
flora and fauna as possible. The legislative history is 
replete with examples, like that of the discovery of penicil-
lin from a common mold, showing that even the most 
obscure and apparently worthless life forms may some-
4 Compare the Act's definition of "take," 16 U.S.C. (S~pp. V) 
1532(14) with those found in the Marine Mammal ProtectIOn Act, 
86 Stat. 1029,16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1362(13), the Bald Eagle Pro-
tection Act, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 668c, and the regulations of the 
Fish and Wildlife Service implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act, 40 Stat. 755, 16 U.S.C. 703 et seq., the Lacey Act, 31 Stat. 187, 
18 U.S.C. 42 et seq., the Black Bass Act, 44 Stat. 576, 16 U.S.C. 851 
et seq., and other wildlife legislation, 50 C.F.R. 10.12 (1976). 
5 Compare the Act's definition of "wildlife" with those found in 
the Lacey Act, 83 Stat. 281, 18 U.S.C. 43(£) (3), and the general 
regulations of the Fish and Wildlife Service, 50 C.F .R. 10.12 (1976). 
Note also that the Act's protections extend even to plants. 
. 
" , 
'. 
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day prove to be of incalculable benefit to man. This con-
cern was expressed clearly in the following passage from 
the House Report (H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5 (1973)): 
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is 
in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losse,s 
of genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are 
potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which 
we cannot solve, and may provide answers to ques-
tions which we have not yet learned to ask. 
To take a homely, but apt, example: one of the 
critical chemicals in the regulation of ovulation in 
humans was found in a common plant. Once discov-
ered, and analyzed, humans could duplicate it syn-
thetically, but had it never existed-or had it been 
driven out of existence before we knew its potentiali-
ties-we would never have tried to synthesize it in 
the first place. 
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for 
cancer or other scourges, present or future, may lie 
locked up in the structures of plants which may yet 
be undiscovered, much less analyzed? More to the 
point, who is prepared to risk being [sic] those poten-
tial cures by eliminating those plants for all time? 
Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious. 
Congress was clearly aware that extinction is an irre-
versible process and that its adverse consequences may 
not be recognized for years, decades, or even centuries. G 
6 The potential for long-delayed adverse effects from extinction 
is illustrated well by the familiar example of the dodo bird, which 
was slaughtered to extinction by sailors on the island of Mauritius 
in the 1600's. Only in the last year has it. been discovered that the 
large Calivaria tree, through evolutionary adaptation, had become 
completely dependent upon the dodo bird for the germination of its 
seeds, Indeed, until this discovery, it is thought that not a single 
seed of this once abundant and commercially valuable tree had 
germinated in the past 300 years because of the dodo's extinction. 
Temple, Plant-Animal Mutualism: Coevolution with Dodo Leads 
to Near Extinction of Plant, 197 Science 885 (Aug. 26, 1977). 
Because of that awareness, Congress clearly regarded 
the preservation of the earth's genetic diversity as a value 
of fundamental importance. 
Since Congress saw the preservation of the earth's life 
forms as a fundamental value, is it likely that it would 
have delegated to the various federal agencies the discre-
tion to decide for themselves when that fundamental value 
could be sacrificed in favor of other interests? If Con-
gress had meant for such agencies to have that discretion, 
would it not have said so clearly and would not the legis-
lative history have demonstrated that intent? From a 
consideration of the whole legislation, its purpose, and its 
spirit, it is clear that Congress recognized that the ques-
tion whether to extinguish forever an entire species, and 
thus relinquish for all time any possibility of deriving 
human benefit from the unique genetic attributes of that 
species, is peculiarly a question of legislative policy. Cf. 
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393; Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176. Thus, to protect the funda-
mental value which it recognized, Congress reserved ex-
clusively to itself any decision to drive another species 
deliberately to extinction.7 Petitioner, by claiming for it-
7 Despite this reservation of ultimate authority, the consultation 
mechanism Congress provided in Section 7 has been notably effec-
tive in providing a workable means of avoiding further jeopardy 
to the survival of endangered species without halting other federal 
actions and without requiring Congressional intervention. Interior 
Department officials testified in July, 1977, that of the mOTe than 
4,500 consultations under the Act, only this case has resulted in 
a true impasse. See Hearings on the Endangered Species Act before 
the Subcommittee on Resource Protection of the Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 97-101 
(1977). Even here, however, according to a recent report of the 
General Accounting Office, the existing impasse might be broken 
if petitioner were willing to consider a comprehensive river-based 
regional development project, as an alternative to Tellico Dam. See, 
Report to the Congress-The Tennessee Valley Authority's 'J1ellico 
Dam Project: Costs, Alternatives, and Benefits, Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, EMD-77-58 (October 14, 1977), pp. 40-41. 
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self a discretion which the Act simply does not confer, 
seeks to usurp the power Congress sought to retain, and 
thus violates the elementary principle of administrative 
law that agencies "are not free to ignore plain limitations 
on [their] authority." Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345; 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 412-13. 
Only by examining the various provisions of the Act 
in the context of a decades-long history of Congressional 
efforts to develop effective wildlife conservation legislation 
can one properly be said to have undertaken a fair "con-
sideration of the whole legislation" and to have discerned 
its true spirit. It is the petitioner's failure to have done 
so that leads it to the cramped and grudging interpreta-
tion it offers for the language of Section 7. Section 7's 
reference to actions "authorized, funded or carried out" 
by federal agencies is thus read by petitioner as a limita-
tion on the scope of the provision, when in fact those 
words are words of expansion, meant to comprehend all 
manner of actions with which there is any sort of federal 
nexus, either through permit or license ("authorized"), 
financial assistance ("funded" ), or direct undertaking 
("carried out"). 
Similarly, petitioner's reliance on case law developed 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEP A) , 
83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., to find an implied 
exemption for activities or projects in an advanced stage 
of completion evidences a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the purposes and spirit of the Endangered Species 
Act. The concern of the Act is the preservation of species 
in danger of extinction. If preservation efforts fail, a 
unique life form containing unique genetic attributes is 
lost forever, and the genetic diversity of the earth is 
irretrievably diminished. Thus, whatever the rule may be 
under NEP A, a project should not be considered to be in 
compliance with the Endangered Species Act so long as 
10 
what remains to be done can bring about the extinction 
of an endangered species. Put differently, the rules de-
veloped under NEP A cannot control the interpretation 
of the Endangered Species Act because the duty imposed 
by NEP A is at bottom a procedural duty to "consider" 
the environmental impacts of a proposed action and then 
to make a final decision that reflects that consideration, 
whereas the duty to "insure" against further jeopardy of 
an endangered species or destruction of its habitat is a 
substantive duty which circumscribes the discretion of a 
federal agency in its final decision making.s 
Even assuming, however, that the rules developed under 
NEP A should be transferred to the Endangered Species 
Act, it is by no means clear that those rules dictate 
exempting this project from the applicability of the Act. 
Petitioner relies chiefly upon, and quotes extensively from, 
Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 
1323 (C.A. 4), certiorari denied sub nom. Fugate v. 
Arlington Coalition on Transportation, 409 U.S. 1000. 
Petitioner fails to quote, however, the sentence immedi-
ately following the passage quoted in its brief, in which 
the Arlington Coalition court notes that "doubt about 
whether the critical stage has been reached must be re-
S This fundamental difference between the duty imposed by NEP A 
and that imposed by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act is 
clearly illustrated in the following passage from National Wildlife 
Federation v. Coleman, 529' F.2d 359, 373 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied 
sub nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979: "In 
holding that the appellees have 'adequately considered' the effects of 
the highway on the crane, the district court misconstrued the direc-
tive of § 7. As we have pointed out, § 7 imposes on all federal agen-
cies the mandatory obligation to insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by them does not jeopardize the existence of 
an endangered species or destroy critical habitat of such species .... 
Although the [environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to 
NEP A] and the administrative record indicates [sic] that the appel-
lees have recognized and considered the danger the highway poses 
to the crane, they have failed to take the necessary steps 'to insure' 
that the highway will not jeopardize the crane or modify its habitat." 
I 
~. 
11 
solved in favor of applicability." 458 F.2d at 1331. Where 
the adverse environmental consequences are as certain and 
as major as they are here, and where the Congressional 
concern with such consequences is clearly so specific as it 
is here, even the Arlington Coalition test supports ap-
plicability of the Endangered Species Act. 
The result argued for here cannot fairly be charac-
terized, as petitioner has suggested, as absurd or unrea-
sonable. The Book of Genesis records that God once 
destroyed all of man's works, but only after first direct-
ing Noah to take with him into the ark his family "and 
every beast after his kind, and all the cattle after their 
kind, and every creeping thing that creepeth upon the 
earth after his kind, and every fowl after his kind, every 
bird of every sort." The Endangered Species Act repre-
sents a determined, perhaps even desperate, effort to keep 
that biblical ark afloat. Along the way, it is true that a 
lot of species have fallen off the ark, some have even been 
unknowingly crowded off by man himself; never before, 
however, has any species been intentionally thrown over-
board. 
II. The Legislative History Of The Endangered Species 
Act Clearly Supports The Conclusion That Section 7 
Was Intended To Apply In Circumstances Like Those 
Of This Case. 
Perhaps recognizing the failure of its attack on the 
"plain meaning" of Section 7 to give due consideration 
to the whole legislation, petitioner next resorts to the leg-
islative history of the Endangered Species Act in an effort 
to avoid the clear duty which Section 7 imposes. This 
effort must be rejected. It is an axiomatic principle of 
statutory construction that where the meaning of a stat-
ute is plain and unambiguous, examination of the legisla-
tive history is not only unnecessary, but is impermissible. 
Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55; Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470. Legislative history cannot be used to change 
" ... . . 
.-<1' ... .. 
-c-
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the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute. United 
States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643. Even assuming that 
resort to legislative history is appropriate in this case, 
that history is clearly contrary to petitioner's position. 
According to petitioner's brief, the legislative history 
of the Endangered Species Act reveals only two instances 
which shed any light on how Section 7 should be inter-
preted in circumstances such as those presented by this 
case, and those two instances offer conflicting interpreta-
tions of the meaning of that provision. In fact, however, 
the legislative history overwhelmingly supports the read-
ing of Section 7 followed by the court of appeals. 
Just as petitioner failed, in its examination of the 
language of Section 7, to consider the total context of 
the Act, so too does it fail, in its examination of the leg-
islative history of that provision, to consider the total 
legislative context so essential to a proper understanding 
of the intent underlying the section. That fuller consid-
eration requires an examination not only of the legislative 
history of the Endangered Species Act, but also of the 
legislation that it superceded. 
The first formal national program of endangered species 
conservation was authorized by the Endangered Species 
Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926. 
The program initiated by the 1966 Act was modest in 
scope, principally authorizing the Secretary of the Interior 
to use various existing land acquisition authorities for the 
purpose of protecting endangered species. The 1966 Act 
did include, however, a provision imposing certain quali-
fied duties on other federal agencies. This provision, 
from which Section 7 of the 1973 Act was derived, di-
rected the Secretary of the Interior to "encourage" other 
federal agencies to utilize their authorities in furtherance 
I of the purposes of the Act, but only "where practicable" 
to do so. Pub. L. 89-669, § 2 (d), 80 Stat. 927. 
, 
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The qualified duty imposed on federal agencies by the 
1966 Act, by leaving with each agency the final discretion 
whether to proceed with a given action, followed a familiar 
pattern established in the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 564, 16 U.S.C. 662 (b), and subse-
quently reflected in much other environmental legislation, 
including Section 4 (f) of the Transportation Act of 1966, 
80 Stat. 934, 49 U.S.C. 1653 (f), and the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. 
4321 et seq. Against this background of wildlife and other 
environmental legislation that always left an "escape 
route" by which agencies could avoid compliance, Con-
gress in 1973 recognized that the fundamental goal of 
preserving genetic diversity required legislation which 
would unequivocally close off those escape routes. In 1972 
and 1973, the Executive Branch introduced proposed leg-
islation which included a provision identical to the lan-
guage of Section 7 as it was subsequently enacted, except 
that it lacked a reference to critical habitat. 9 In hearings 
before a committee of the Senate, an Administration wit-
ness testified that the provision in question "for the first 
time would prohibit another Federal agency from taking 
action which does jeopardize the status of endangered 
species." 10 Elsewhere in those same hearings, the follow-
ing exchange occurred between Senator Cook and Curtis 
9 S. 1592, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(d) (1973), reprinted in Hear-
ings on the Endangered Species Act of 1973 Before the Subcommit-
tee on Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) (hereafter "Senate hearings") ; H.R. 4758, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(d) (1973), reprinted in Hearings on En-
dangered Species Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife 
Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1973) 
(hereafter "House hearings") . 
10 Senate hearings at 68 (emphasis added) (remarks of Mr. 
Wheeler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and 
Parks of the Department of the Interior). 
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Bohlen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife 
and Parks of the Department of the Interior: 11 
Senator Cook. What dO' we dO' in the situation that 
we have had to fight over on this side for the last 
3 years where the Corps of Engineers has made a 
determination because they built a new lake that they 
are going to put a road right through ... the nesting 
areas of wild turkeys in that part of the cO'unty, and 
it is the only place where they are? What is the au-
thority under this that you can prohibit the Corps of 
Engineers on an interagency basis from building the 
road? 
The only way I have gone abO'ut it is to' put an 
amendment in the public works bill that these fellows 
have to have an environmental impact study, and 
therefore, I have been able to hold it up. 
Do we have authority under this act that immedi-
ate steps could be taken, that yO'U can on a bureau-
cratic basis say to the Corps, you can't dO' it? 
Mr. Bohlen. There is a provision in the act, Senator, 
in section 3 (d) . 
Section 3 (d) of the Administration bill was, as discussed 
above, essentially identical to' the language of Section 7 
as it was subsequently enacted. In hearings. before a 
committee O'f the House, the Administration again took 
the positiO'n that the prO'vision in question constituted "the 
first piece of substantive law which agencies would have 
to adhere to in carrying out their programs and duties, 
as it would prevent them from taking action which would 
jeopardize the continued existence of endangered spe-
cies." 12 Far from weakening this proposed prO'visiO'n, Con-
11 Senate hearings at 67-68. 
12 The quoted language is taken from the Department of the In-
terior's draft environmental impact statement concerning the pro-
posed Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1972 which was sub-
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gress actually strengthened it by adding to its prohibition 
against jeopardizing the continued existence of endan-
gered species a further prohibition against modifying or 
destroying their critical habitat. '·3 
The intent to establish by Section 7 an unequivocal 
substantive duty is clearly reflected throughO'ut the subse-
quent legislative history of the Act. The House Report 
offered the following example of the section's import (H.R. 
Rep. No. 93-412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973)): 
"Under the authority of this paragraph, for example, 
the Director of the Park Service would be required to 
confO'rm the practices of his agency to the need for 
protecting the rapidly dwindling stock of grizzly 
bears within Yellowstone Park. These bears, which 
may be endangered, and are undeniably threatened, 
should at least be protected by supplying them with 
carcasses from excess elk within the park, by curtail-
ing the destruction of habitat by clearcutting Na-
tional Forests surrounding the Park, and by prevent-
ing hunting until their numbers have recovered suffi-
ciently to withstand these pressures." 
mitted by the Department of the Interior to the appropriate sub-
committee of the House as part of the latter's hearing record on the 
Administration's essentially identical IH73 bill. See House hearings 
at 188. 
1 3 A parallel strengthening of the 1973 Act over its 1966 predeces-
sor can be seen in the respective statements of policy set forth in 
the two Acts. The 1966 Act declared the policy of Congress to be 
"that the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and 
the Secretary of Defense, together with the heads of bureaus, agen-
cies, and services within their departments, shall seek to protect 
species of native fish and wildlife, including migratory birds, that 
are threatened with extinction, and, insofar as is practicable and 
consistent with the primary purposes of such bureaus, agencies, and 
services, shall preserve the habitats of such threatened species on 
lands under their jurisdiction." Pub. L. 89-669, § 1 (b), 80 Stat. 926. 
The 1973 Act expanded this statement of policy to encompass all 
federal departments and agencies, and eliminated the qualifying 
language relating to practicability and consistency with other pur-
poses. See 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1531 (c). 
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In explaining the conference bill to the House of Rep-
resentatives, Congressman John Dingell, Chairman of the 
House subcommittee in which the legislation had origi-
nated and House manager of the bill, reiterated the grizzly 
bear example offered in the House report and also offered 
a further example concerning Air Force bombing activi-
ties near the winter range of the whooping crane. Peti-
tioner's brief quotes in part the remarks of Congressman 
Dingell concerning the-whooping crane, but fails to quote 
his conclusion that immediately follows (119 Congo Rec. 
42913 (1973) (emphasis added) ) : 
"It is a pity that we must wait until a, species is 
faced with extermination before we begin to do those 
things that we should have done much earlier, but at 
least when and if that unfortunate stage is reached, 
the agencies of Government can no longer plead that 
they can do nothing about it. They can, and they 
must. The law is clear." 
The only instance in the entire legislative history that 
petitioner cites to suggest a more restricted understanding 
of Section 7 is the statement of Senator Tunney quoted 
at page 33 of petitioner's brief to the effect that each fed-
eral agency retains final authority to decide whether to 
go forward with those actions which it proposes . . That 
statement, however, was interpreted in National Wildlife 
Federation V. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371-72 (C.A. 5), 
certiorari denied, sub nom. Boteler V. National Wildlife 
Federation, 429 U.S. 979, as meaning that although the 
federal agency proposing to undertake the action retains 
the final authority to decide whether to do so, the question 
whether its decision satisfies the statutory standard of 
insuring against the further jeopardization of an endan-
gered species is still subject to judicial review. Even if 
Senator Tunney meant otherwise, his statement stands at 
odds with all the other legislative history cited above and 
with the clear language of the statute itself. .. 
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III. Subsequent Congressional Appropriations For Tellico 
Dam Neither Repealed Nor Implicitly Amended The 
Endangered Species Act. 
Petitioner contends that enactment of appropriations 
legislation for Tellico Dam in 1975, 1976, and 1977 im-
plicitly repealed or amended Section 7 of the Endangere.d 
Species Act insofar as it applied to Tellico Dam. PetI-
tioner's contention is based upon a misreading of these 
various appropriations statutes and is unsupported by per-
suasive legal authority. 
First, as to the appropriations statute enacted in 197~/4 
it must be noted that the House Committee on ApproprIa-
tions report 15 directing the completion of Tellico Dam "as 
promptly as possible" was issued before the snail dar.ter 
was even officially designated as an endangered speCIes. 
There is no evidence that when this legislation was con-
sidered on the floor of the House and Senate, either house 
was aware of the listing which had occurred shortly be-
fore or of the potential conflict that listing presented. 
As to the appropriations statute enacted in 1976/6 
petitioner relies upon a report of the Senate Committee 
on Appropriations which states in part that "[ t] he Com-
mittee does not view the Endangered Species Act as pro-
hibiting the completion of the Tellico project .... " 1 7 Far 
from evidencing a Congressional intent to repeal or amend 
the Endangered Species Act, this statement clearly shows 
that the Committee was simply expressing its interpreta-
tion of that Act. The Committee's interpretation found 
support in the decision of the district court in this case, 
14 Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy 
Research Appropriation Act, 1976, Pub. L. 94-180, 89 Stat. 1035. 
15 H.R. Rep. No. 94-319, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
16 Public Works for Wat~r and Power Development and Energy 
Research Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. 94-355, 90 Stat. 889. 
17 S. Rep. No. 94-960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1976). 
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which had been handed down only three weeks before the 
Committee report was issued. However, as the court of 
appeals subsequently found, and as we contend here, the 
Committee's (and the district court's) interpretation was 
erroneous. That, however, does not change the obvious 
fact that the Committee was simply interpreting legisla-
tion, not amending it. 
As to the 1977 appropriations legislation,18 it is true 
that Congress was by then aware of the conflict between 
the dam and the snail darter and that at least the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations believed that the dam should 
be completed notwithstanding the Endangered Species Act. 
However, the legislation that Congress ultimately enacted 
provided a special appropriation for such efforts to relo-
cate the fish "as may be necessary to expedite project con-
struction." 19 The clear implication of this language is 
that Congress recognized that absent some means of avoid-
ing the existing impasse, such as by successful relocation, 
project construction could not continue. 2{) 
Wholly apart from petitioner's misreading of the vari-
ous appropriations statutes discussed above, it is clear 
that there is no persuasive legal authority to support con-
struing those statutes to repeal or amend the Endangered 
Species Act. Petitioner recognizes the well established 
principle disfavoring repeal by implication, and acknowl-
edges its special force in the case of appropriations legis-
lation (Pet. Br., p. 39). Nonetheless, petitioner argues 
18 Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy 
Research Appropriation Act, 1978, Pub. L. 95-96, 91 Stat. 797. 
19 Id. at 91 Stat. 808. 
20 This conclusion is supported by the fact that at the same time 
that the appropriations legislation was being considered and passed, 
Congress had, and continues to have before it proposed legislation 
which would specifically amend Section 7 of the Endangered Species 
Act so as to allow completion of Tellico Dam. S ee, H.R. 4167, H.R. 
4557, and H.R. 5079, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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that this case should be treated as an exception to that 
rule. 
Petitioner's Procrustean effort to fit · the facts of this 
case within the recognized narrow exceptions fails because 
the cases that support those exceptions are simply inap-
posite. The only decisions of this Court which petitioner 
cites in which a subsequent appropriations act has been 
held to change or repeal pre-existing law are ones in 
which the affected provision of the pre-existing law ex-
pressly concerns the payment of money.21 It would be a 
major and unwarranted extension of these cases to apply 
them to a situation where, as here, the affected provision 
of the pre-existing legislation imposes a substantive duty 
unrelated to the payment of money. 
The only other case on which petitioner rests its argu-
ment is Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 
(C.A. 10), certiorari denied sub nom. Friends of the 
Earth v. Stamm, 414 U.S. 1171. Although there the af-
fected pre-existing provisions did not relate to the pay-
ment of money, the facts of the case clearly show that it 
is inapposite here. First, the pre-existing provisions, part 
of the Colorado River Storage Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 105, 
43 U.S.C. 620 et seq., were held to be inconsistent not only 
with subsequent appropriations measures, but also with 
subsequently enacted substantive legislation, including the 
Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968.2 2 Second, the 
court implied that the affected pre-existing provisions, 
21 I.e., United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554; United States v. 
Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146 ; United States v. Vulte, 233 U.S. 509; United 
States v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389; Dunwoody v. United States, 143 
U.S. 578. Of the same character is City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 
556 F.2d 40 (C.A.D.C.), also cited by petitioner. 
22 82 Stat. 886, 43 U.S.C. 1501 et seq. See 485 F.2d at 10: "In 
addition to the Appropriation Acts, we have considered the other acts 
of Congress, described above, which concerned other dams and 
projects within the scope of the Storage Act in reaching our 
. conclusions." 
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which directed the Secretary of the Interior to "take ade-
quate protective measures to preclude impairment of the 
Rainbow Bridge National Monument," and which ex-
pressed a Congressional intent that no reservoir con-
structed under the 1956 Act be within any national park 
or monument, were themselves inconsistent with the at-
tainment of the very objectives of the 1956 Act. 2.3 
Finally, and most importantly, the court expressed some 
doubt whether the challenged administrative action of fill-
ing the reservoir to capacity would even have the effect 
of impairing the national monument. The court noted 
that even at maximum capacity, the water that passed 
under Rainbow Bridge, a natural sandstone arch which 
was the principal attraction of the monument, would re-
main within the banks of its canyon and would not cause 
any structural damage to the Bridge. As a precautionary 
measure against the possibility that the water would rise 
to unexpectedly high levels or that some damage might 
occur to the Bridge, the court "directed that the trial 
court retain jurisdiction of this action for ten years after 
the date of the mandate herein. This retention of juris-
diction will permit the plaintiffs to seek further relief 
within that time if either of the indicated events occurs." 
485 F.2d at 12. 
Here there is no doubt but that the challenged adminis-
trative action will have the effect prohibited by the En-
dangered Species Act. Unlike the situation in Friends of 
the Earth v. Armstrong, the damage to be done here can-
not be undone simply by lowering the reservoir. Extinc-
tion is irreversible. This fundamental difference makes 
the precedent of Friends of the Earth inapplicable here. 
23 See 485 F.2d at 10: "To so radically change the effectiveness of 
the principal regulating reservair is to' prevent the attainment af 
the objectives of the Colorado River Compacts, and to prevent the 
fulfillment of the objectives of the Colorado River Storage Act and 
the Colorado River Basin Project Act." ., : 
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Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the subsequent 
Congressional appropriations for Tellico Dam cannot be 
read as repealing or impliedly amending the Endangered 
Species Act and that no persuasive legal authority exists 
on which such a reading could be based. 
CONCLUSION 
The language of Section 7 of the Endangered Species 
Act is clear. The manifestly evident purpose and spirit 
of the statute support the interpretation given it by the 
court below, as does its legislative history. For all these 
reasons, and to further the Congressionally declared fun-
damental goal of preserving the earth's genetic diversity, 
the parties to this brief amicus curiae urge the Court to 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
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